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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS 
 
Upstream – Federal  
 
9th Cir.  
N. Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Cont’l Res. Inc., No. 17-36023, 2018 WL 6721677 
(9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2018). 
 
Gas Company and Resource Company disputed over who held valid lease 
to a property. Gas Company filed suit seeking quiet title, and the parties 
filed competing claims of summary judgment. When the district court 
found in favor of Gas Company, Resource Company filed a motion 
demanding that Gas Company participate in the costs of the well on the 
property. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Resource Company 
did not meet the requirement of pooling units before the term of the lease; 
this meant that any drilling it commenced on any other unit during that time 
did not count as for the lease on the property in question. Additionally, the 
court determined that Gas Company did not expressly or impliedly indicate 
consent to participate in the well, and thus, was not required to participate 
in the costs thereunder. 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
M.D. Pennsylvania 
Chambers v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., NO. 3:18-CV-00437, 2019 
WL 183854 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2019). 
 
Owners sued Lessees after Lessees breached unitization and royalty clauses 
in their lease agreements. The unitization clause allowed for Lessee to 
group lessor’s land with neighboring lessor’s land to create one oil 
production unit in order to better capture underground resources. However, 
the unitization clause also requires that Lessee must develop one well per 
every 160 acres of oil production units. This ratio is the well density 
requirement. The royalty clause required Lessee to pay Owners one-eighth 
the price Lessee received per thousand cubic feet of resources sold. Owners 
crossed out the language in the lease agreement that allowed Lessee to 
reduce Owners’ royalties by the costs Lessee incurred for post-production 
costs. Owners believed that crossing out such language before signing 
would change the terms of the agreement, but Lessee continued to deduct 
such costs from the royalties paid. Moreover, Owners alleged that Lessee 
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had sold the resources far below market value to a subsidiary corporation in 
order to pay lower royalties to Owners. Lessees moved to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim. The court, however, held that Owners sufficiently 
alleged breach of contract claims, primarily because (1) the language of the 
leases was unclear as to which parcels the unitization clause applied to, and 
(2) Owners’ theory about Lessee’s bad faith, under-market sales tactic was 
plausible. 
 
Russell v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., No. 4:14-CV-00148, 2018 WL 
6804764 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 2018).  
 
Landowners brought action against Well Operator, alleging various claims 
of nuisance and negligence by creating excessive noise, traffic dust, light, 
air pollution, and diminished water quality. Well Operator filed a motion 
for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred by the two-year 
statute of limitations period for nuisance actions in Pennsylvania. 
Importantly, the court noted that a permanent nuisance claim accrues at the 
time the plaintiff was first injured, but a continuing nuisance claim accrues 
anew upon each new injury. The court held that the Well Operator’s 
operations constituted a permanent nuisance and was thus time-barred by 
the statute of limitations. Specifically, the court noted that (1) the character 
of the structure or thing that produced Landowners injury spells 
permanence; (2) that Landowners conceded that the injury was related to 
Well Operator’s extraction of natural gas, which Landowners had not 
claimed would halt anytime, meaning that it would be continuous; and (3) 
that Landowners’ past and future damages may be predictably ascertained. 
Effectively, the court held that Landowners alleged a permanent nuisance 
as a matter of law. Given that the alleged harms accrued outside of the two-
year statute of limitations period, the court granted Well Operator’s motion 
for summary judgment.  
 
S.D. Texas 
OOGC Am. LLC v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., No. H-17-248, 2018 WL 
6333830 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2018). 
 
Operator and Non-Operator jointly owned working interests in multiple oil 
and gas leases. A dispute arose between Operator and Non-Operator 
regarding how certain companies should be classified, and whether those 
companies charged excessive rates to the joint account in violation of 
contractual provisions. Non-Operator ordered arbitration, and both Non-
Operator and Operator each appointed one person to the panel, with a third 
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person being chosen jointly by the two other panel members. Hearings were 
conducted, and during one, Operator’s arbitrator failed to disclose the long-
standing business relationship with one of the companies being classified. 
Non-Operator moved to have the arbitrations vacated, alleging that 
Operator’s arbitrator tainted and influenced the other members of the panel. 
The trial court found that Operator’s arbitrator lied when he failed to 
disclose the relationship, as he was under a continuous duty to check for 
conflicts and disclose them throughout the arbitration process. Operator was 
found to be aware of the conflicts and failed to disclose. As such, the court 
vacated the awards. 
 
This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher 
court as of publication. 
 
Verde Minerals, LLC v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co., LP, No. 2:16-CV-
463, 2019 WL 145017 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2019).  
 
Oil and gas interest owners (“Interest Owners”) brought a class action suit 
against Oil and Gas Companies (“Companies”) who owned a royalty 
interest in property, arguing that Companies were obligated by their 
predecessors-in-interest to pay a share of royalties derived from the 
property. The property in question was conveyed in 1912 and was 
accompanied by a vendor’s lien, which allowed grantee to tender partial 
payment to release selected portions of the property. Eventually, a portion 
of the released property was deeded to Interest Owners’ predecessors-in-
interest in which the grantor conveyed a small surface estate and a 
proportionate share of half of any oil and gas proceeds derived from 
anywhere in the overall property (around 2,000 acres) of the grantor 
(Companies’ predecessor). Both parties sought summary judgment. The 
court granted in part and denied in part Interest Owner’s motion, finding 
that: (1) the second conveyance need not pinpoint the particular surface 
estate granted to satisfy the statute of frauds as to the amount of the 
grantee’s interest in oil and gas; (2) the second conveyance conveyed a 
floating royalty interest, not a mineral interest, because even absent the 
word “royalty,” the deed unambiguously intended to convey a fraction of 
half of the proceeds from oil and gas production that the grantor received 
from the property; (3) the fact that the conveyance described the interest as 
a “covenant” did not automatically establish an unenforceable personal 
covenant; (4) the possibility that the grantees may not have received 
royalties for several years did not violate the rule against perpetuities; (5) 
the lien release clause in the original deed allowed the property in question 
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to be released subject to partial payment; and (6) Companies did not acquire 
title in the Interest Owners’ royalty interest since they only held a 
nonpossessory interest themselves as lessors. 
 
Upstream – State  
 
North Dakota 
Dale Expl., LLC v. Hiepler, 2018 ND 271, 920 N.W.2d 750. 
 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that a mineral deed executed by 
Mineral Owner to Oil Company required the conveyance of the lease to Oil 
Company via specific performance and that monetary damages were the 
incorrect remedy. In 2007, Oil Company paid Mineral Owner for 150 
mineral acres. However, Mineral Owner only owned 7.363 of the mineral 
acres, and the remaining 142.6 mineral acres were owned by a trust set up 
by Mineral Owner. Oil Company did not perform a title check and did not 
contact Mineral Owner about the discrepancy until 2011. In 2009, the trust 
leased the contested mineral acres to a third-party purchaser. Exploration 
Company received the contested 150 mineral acres from the third-party 
purchaser and in 2014 filed a quiet title action against Oil Company for that 
acreage. The trial court determined that specific performance would be 
inappropriate because of the covenant of seizing, and Mineral Owner 
violated it by conveying to Oil Company what the trust owned and awarded 
monetary damages. The Court held that the covenant of seizing is only 
appropriate when specific performance is not possible, and the burden to 
show specific performance is upon the requesting party. The Court 
accordingly reversed the trial court ruling, holding that it erred in failing to 
follow the presumption that for real property, specific performance, rather 
than monetary damages, is the proper remedy. 
 
Desert Partners IV, L.P. v. Benson, 2019 ND 19, 921 N.W.2d 444.  
 
Purchasers brought a quiet title suit against Owners for mineral interests. 
The original owner of the mineral interests made multiple conveyances of 
the same interests for two decades. While Owners’ deed was executed 
before Purchaser’s deed, Owners failed to file the deed until after 
Purchasers filed their deed. Because Purchasers had no notice of the title 
defects at the time they purchased the interests and filed their deed, 
Purchasers were good-faith buyers. After a series of summary judgements, 
appeals, and reversals and remands, the court affirmed the lower court’s 
finding that Purchasers were the true owners of the mineral interests. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019




Sharp v. Miller, 2018-Ohio-4740, 114 N.E.3d 1285. 
 
Property Owners (“Owners”) originally reserved interests in property using 
language “excepting and reserving all mineral rights.” Accordingly, Owners 
were conveyed surface rights. Owners then entered into an oil and gas lease 
and filed notice of intent to declare the mineral interests abandoned after 
searching for names of Heirs. However, Heirs then learned coal interest and 
mineral interest had been reserved. Heirs filed a complaint, requesting that 
the court declare Owners in noncompliance with the 2006 DMA, quiet title, 
and termination of lease. They also raised a conversion claim. Several 
months later, Heirs filed an amended complaint seeking a declaratory 
judgment, ejectment, and the value of the rents from the oil and gas leases. 
Both parties then filed motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment 
was granted to Owners, finding that Heirs had abandoned the mineral rights 
on the property. Heirs appealed, and the appellate court found that because 
Owners filed appropriate notice, Heirs failed to file a timely claim of 
preservation or an affidavit identifying a savings event. As such, under the 
2006 DMA, Heirs had abandoned their mineral rights and were not entitled 
to summary judgment. Thus, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.  
 
Pennsylvania 
Snyder Bros., Inc. v. Penn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 198 A.3d 1056 (Pa. 2018).  
 
Corporation drilled and operated vertical wells in State. State Public 
Utilities Commission (“Commission”) found that Corporation had failed to 
identify 45 vertical gas wells in its report, and also failed to remit the 
impact fees. Corporation petitioned for a review of Commission’s order, 
and Commission petitioned for allowance of appeal. The words of the 
statute requiring identification of vertical gas wells was argued to be 
unclear. For a statute to be applicable, it must be “clear and free from 
ambiguity, [and] the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of 
pursuing its spirit.” If the statute is found to be unclear, a statutes’ intent 
can be determined by the reason for the statute, the circumstances of the 
statute being created, the focus of the statute, and former law. Particularly 
important in this case is the phrase “stripper well.” A stripper well is 
defined as “an unconventional gas well incapable of producing more than 
90,000 cubic feet of gas per day during any calendar month,” while a 
vertical gas well is defined as “an unconventional gas well which. . . 
produces natural gas in quantities greater than that of a stripper well.” As 
such, Corporation’s wells would have had to produce more than 90,000 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss6/7
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cubic feet of gas per day during any calendar month to qualify as a vertical 
gas well. The court found that the wells at issue met this criterion and, 
therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the lower court.  
 
Texas 
Green v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., No. 02-17-00405-CV, 2018 WL 
6565790 (Tex. App. Dec. 13, 2018).  
 
Trust sued Drilling Company for trespass to try title to a Mineral Tract, 
money had and received, and a declaratory judgment in addition to separate 
causes of action for trespass and breach of leases. On appeal, the court 
considered whether a 1972 deed conveyed – in addition to the described 
land – title to an adjoining 30-acre mineral estate under the strip-and-gore 
doctrine or whether the grantor of the adjoining land intended to retain the 
mineral estate.  The court held that the strip-and-gore doctrine is used to aid 
in determining a grantor’s intent as to land not described in the lease, and in 
this case, the court agreed with the trial court’s determination that the deed 
conveying the Tract must have included the Mineral Tract as well. As such, 
the court determined that the strip-and-gore doctrine presumption of 
inclusion of the Mineral Tract applied and rejected the first issue. 
Additionally, because the strip-and-gore doctrine applied here and 
compelled the conclusion that the conveyance was intended to convey the 
Mineral Tract, the court held that this land was no longer owned by Trust at 
all, so the other claims must fail as well.  
 
Midstream – Federal 
 
S.D. West Virginia 
United States v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 2:18-cv-01175, 2019 WL 97820 
(S.D. W.Va. Jan. 3, 2019). 
 
The United States and State filed a complaint against Transportation 
Company under the CWA and the West Virginia Water Pollution Control 
Act after Transportation Company’s train carrying Bakken crude oil 
derailed and caused significant damage to the surrounding area. The 
damage included a widespread power outage, the disabling of a water 
intake system that served over 2,000 people, evacuation of nearby 
communities, and pollution to a nearby river. This memorandum opinion 
concerns the U.S. and State’s unopposed motion to enter a consent decree, 
which requires Transportation Company to pay various penalties and 
complete an environmental project. Noting that the court is required to 
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determine the fairness of the consent decree through a deferential standard, 
the court found that the terms of the decree were fair and reasonable. 
However, the court expressed reluctance in agreeing with the amount of the 
fines imposed, due to both the severity of the damage caused by the 
derailment and the probability that it would serve as a deterrent. Ultimately, 
the court granted the unopposed motion to enter the consent decree.  
 
Midstream – State 
 
Texas 
Banta Oilfield Servs., Inc. v. Mewbourne Oil Co., No. 06-17-00107-CV, 
2018 WL 6314663 (Tex. App. Dec. 4, 2018). 
 
Following an injury at an oilfield site, Servicing Company sued Producer 
because of its failure to indemnify them. The trial court below granted 
Producer’s motion for summary judgment. On review, the Court of Appeals 
of Texas made several holdings. Servicing Company and Producer agreed 
that a “Master Services Agreement” (“Contract”) governed their 
relationship. First, Producer cannot prevail on its argument for judicial 
estoppel because Servicing Company failed to demonstrate that Producer 
“made a prior, sworn, inconsistent statement” to those made during 
previous litigation. Second, Servicing Company’s claim of quasi-estoppel 
fails because Producer was not a party, nor was it involved in the previous 
litigation. Third, Texas law governs the Contract because, throughout the 
Contract, it is stated that Texas substantive law shall apply, and the 
Contract itself points to specific sections of the Texas Civil Practice and 
Remedies Code. Fourth, the choice of law provision in the Contract is 
enforceable for several reasons in accord with the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws. For example, the provision is enforceable because: (1) 
Texas has “substantial relationship to the parties,” (2) Texas “has the most 
significant relationship to the parties and the transaction,” and (3) the 
parties anticipated Texas law to apply regardless of where the Contract was 
performed. Fifth, the Contract was enforceable under Texas law for two 
reasons: (1) Servicing Company can claim indemnity because even though 
the injured person was not Producer’s “employee,” the injured person was 
within the covered “contractor,” language in the Contract, and (2) Producer 




2019]        Recent Case Decisions 847 
  
 




D. Rhode Island 
Rhode Island v. Atl. Richfield Co., C.A. No. 17-204 WES, 2018 WL 
6505394 (D.R.I. Dec. 11, 2018). 
 
State brought this action against various chemical companies 
(“Companies”) to recover damages for the contamination of State waters by 
a hazardous gasoline additive. State brought numerous claims including 
nuisance, trespass, impairment of public trust, Underground Tank 
Responsibility Act (“UTRA”) violations, and Water Pollution Act 
violations. Companies moved to dismiss all claims. The court performed an 
analysis on notice, standing, causation, and personal jurisdiction and found 
that all but State’s UTRA and impairment of public trust claims survived 
the motion to dismiss. The court ruled the UTRA claim failed because the 
state never ordered the companies remedy leaking tanks and because State 
was asserting its own rights as opposed to a party with de facto insurance 
from UTRA. The public trust claim failed because State does not recognize 
groundwater as a trust asset at this time. As such, Companies’ motion for 





NOW!, Inc. v. Ind.-Am. Water Co., Inc., 117 N.E.3d 647 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2018). 
 
City’s water infrastructure was failing, so City contracted to sell its water 
utility to Company. Activist petitioned Utility Commission to stop the sale. 
City and Company subsequently petitioned Commission to approve the 
sale, which Commission agreed to since the sale was in the public’s 
interest. Activist appealed, claiming that: (1) the purchase price for the 
utility was unreasonable; (2) City did not substantially comply with a 
statutory requirement to make information related to utility appraisals 
public; and (3) City did not comply with a procedural statute that governs 
public hearings for municipal utilities. Here, the court found that City 
conducted an appraisal of the water infrastructure, and the contract with 
Company was made in accordance with the appraisal findings. Further, City 
held a public hearing regarding the appraisal, and proper notice of the 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
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hearing was published in the local paper approximately a month before the 
hearing date. As such, the court held for City and Company because City 
complied with all relevant procedural statutes, and Company’s price for the 
water utility was fair. 
 
Oregon 
Chernaik v. Brown, No. A159826, 295 Or. App. 584 (Or. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 
2019).   
 
Through a guardian ad litem, Minors brought this action against State, 
seeking declaratory and equitable relief for failing to protect State’s public 
trust resources from the effects of climate change.  Minors sought to impose 
a fiduciary-like duty onto the State, relying on the common law public trust 
doctrine. Minors wished to impose an obligation on the State to 
affirmatively protect public trust resources from climate change. However, 
the Court of Appeals of Oregon found that the common-law public trust 
doctrine did not require a fiduciary obligation similar to that of a legal trust. 
The court ruled that State only had an obligation to restrain itself from 
impairing the common-law public right to use public-trust resources for 
certain purposes. State’s motion for summary judgment was properly 
granted, but the case was remanded for a determination of the parties’ 
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10th Cir.  
Bay v. Anadarko E&P Onshore LLC, 912 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2018).  
 
Surface Owners brought class action suit alleging that Mineral Owner, 
through its lessee, exceeded the scope of the easement by using excessive 
surface land to drill for oil and gas. When the district court granted 
summary judgment in part and judgment as a matter of law in part for 
Mineral Owners, Surface owners appealed. Under a de novo standard of 
review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the deed’s convenient 
or necessary clause did not expand Mineral Owner’s rights beyond those 
implied by common law since the plain terms of the deed afforded no more 
rights than “convenient.” Further, the court held that under Colorado law, a 
deed must clearly define an expansion of mineral ownership rights. 
Additionally, the Surface Owners were not required to show that Operator’s 
use was not commercially reasonable. Finally, Mineral Owner’s alternative 
argument, that it should not be held vicariously liable for its lessee, failed as 
the court determined that Mineral Owners had authorized the trespass.  
 
Maralex Res., Inc. v. Barnhardt, 913 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 
Operator and Owner sued Agency under the APA for allowing the Bureau 
of Land Management (“BLM”) to conduct warrantless and impromptu 
inspections of oil wells on their property. A BLM representative notified 
Owner that he was going to inspect Owner’s wells, and Owner responded 
that because he owned both the surface and mineral rights, BLM had no 
right to inspect the wells, as BLM can usually only inspect private sites 
annually. However, BLM can inspect federal and tribe well sites at any time 
without notice. When the BLM representative showed up for the inspection, 
he was locked out of the well site. He subsequently demanded either a key 
or the ability to put a BLM lock on the site. Owner and Operator challenged 
BLM’s action, but the lower court upheld BLM’s conduct. On appeal, 
Operator and Owner argued that BLM did not have the statutory authority 
to require a key or lock on private well sites, and the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals agreed, holding that BLM lacks the ability to enforce a “key or 
lock” requirement for private lands under the language of the Federal Oil 
and Gas Royalty Management Act. 
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Altamaha Riverkeeper v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No. CV 418-251, 
2018 WL 6496791 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 10, 2018). 
 
Environmental Groups sought a preliminary injunction on a permit granted 
by the Corps to a real estate developer. The district court walked through 
the prerequisites for a preliminary injunction and denied Environmental 
Groups’ request.   To succeed on its motion for a preliminary injunction, 
the moving party must show that (1) its case has a substantial likelihood of 
success on the merits, (2) it will suffer irreparable harm unless the 
injunction is issued, (3) the threatened injury outweighs the injury caused 
by the injunctive relief, and (4) the injunction would not be a disservice to 
the public. Here, because the court found that Corps was arbitrary or 
capricious in its granting of the permit, Environmental Groups’ claim did 
not have a substantial likelihood of success. Furthermore, because 
Environmental Groups failed to state the irreparable harm that would befall 
them if the injunction were not granted, the court found that a preliminary 
injunction would be unjust.  As such, Environmental Groups’ motion for 
preliminary injunction was denied.   
 
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. Grove Ave. Developers, Inc., No. 
2:17cv483, 2019 WL 130168 (E.D. Va. Jan. 8, 2019).  
 
Surface Owner sought to construct an asphalt road over Transmission 
Company’s easement, which contained two high pressure natural gas 
pipelines. Transmission Company brought suit seeking an injunction and 
declaratory judgment against Surface Owner preventing the construction. 
Transmission Company objected to the roadway, unless costly mitigation 
measures were paid for by Surface Owner. Surface Owner contended that 
such mitigation measures were not needed, and that the roadway would not 
endanger the pipelines or interfere with Transmission Company’s access to 
the pipeline. After hearing expert testimony from both parties, the court 
concluded that Surface Owner’s proposed crossing would unreasonably 
interfere with Transmission Company’s right to safely maintain and repair 
the pipelines. The court based its finding on evidence presented, which 
suggested that the planned roadway, without mitigation measures, 
collectively posed enough added risks to the aging pipelines to create an 
unreasonable burden on Transmission Company. For these reasons, the 
court ordered that Surface Owner was enjoined from building the roadway 
in accordance with its proposed plan.  
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Crooks v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 2017-750 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/28/18); No. 17-
750, 2018 WL 6816853. 
 
Landowners brought action against State for injunctive relief and damages 
resulting from the flooding of their land as riparian property. Under the Act 
of Assurance, State agreed to “furnish free of cost to the United States all 
land, easements, and rights of way, including flowage rights in overflow 
areas, and suitable spoil-disposal areas necessary for construction of the 
project and for its subsequent maintenance, when required.” Landowners 
claimed that the area was an overflow area of land, while State argued that 
the land itself was a distinct lake bed. State filed a motion for summary 
judgment, and its motion was granted. Landowners appealed, and summary 
judgment was reversed. Landowners were awarded damages, and State then 
appealed. The appellate court found that: (1) the trial court appropriately 
and sufficiently described property for jurisdictional purposes; (2) 
Landowners had a right to proceed against State for breaches of its promise 
to the United States; (3) the trial court did not err in finding that the area 
was “a permanent river that seasonally overflowed and covered its banks”; 
and (4) Landowners claims were sustained prior to their purchase and, as 
such, Landowners have a right of action. Accordingly, the appellate 
affirmed lower court’s decision in part and vacated in part. 
 
Massachusetts 
Putney v. O’Brien, No. 14 MISC. 488153 (JCC), 2018 WL 6183338 (Mass. 
Land Ct. Nov. 27, 2018). 
 
Drainer filed suit seeking a declaration that it had a “prescriptive easement 
to continue draining surface water” onto Neighbor’s property through a 
pipe system and sought to enjoin Neighbor from blocking up the pipe 
system. Neighbor counterclaimed that the draining of water was 
unauthorized, and thus, trespass and a nuisance. At trial, the court found 
that Drainer did have a prescriptive easement to drain surface water but was 
enjoined from draining additional water, such as that from a pool or a 
“basement sump pump,” through the pipe system. The court further held 
that Neighbor was enjoined from blocking the pipes and had to let the water 
drain freely.  
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Robinson v. MT Clark, Inc., No. 339926, 2018 WL 6252544 (Mich. Ct. 
App. Nov. 29, 2018). 
 
Landowner sued Gas Station, alleging nuisance due to migration of methyl 
tert butyl ether (“MBTE”) into Landowner’s aquifer and well. Landowner 
moved onto the land in 2008 and was notified by State in 2015 that the 
levels of the MBTE present in the aquifer exceeded regulatory limits and 
were unsafe for human use. State provided Landowner with a connection to 
the local municipal water supply free of charge. The trial court found that 
the statute of limitations barred Landowner from bringing suit. Landowner 
subsequently appealed the trial court order granting summary disposition 
for Gas Station, alleging that the statute of limitation should not have run 
because it should have accrued only when Landowner was made aware of 
the damage. The appellate court affirmed the trial court ruling for Gas 
Station because the statute of limitations began to run when Landowner 
tasted the tainted water, not when State informed Landowner that the levels 
of MBTE exceeded regulatory limits. 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
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SELECTED ELECTRICITY DECISIONS 
Rate – State 
 
Arizona 
Woodward v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, Nos. 1 CA-CC 17-0003, 1 CA-CC 17-
0004, 2018 WL 6498615 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018). 
 
State Corporation Commission (“Commission”) held a rate case for Public 
Utility Company to determine the rates that Public Utility Company was 
allowed to implement. Public Utility Company and many other interveners 
litigated with Commission for over a year about the rate case and many 
issues within its completion and findings. After the year, 29 of the 39 
intervenors reached a settlement with Commission, including Public Utility 
Company, though Public Utility Company opposed the final terms. There 
was a proceeding seven-day evidentiary hearing concerning whether the 
settlement agreement resulted in just and reasonable rates, resulting in an 
eventual acceptance and confirmation of the settlement agreement by 
Commission. The Arizona Court of Appeals granted Public Utility 
Company’s appeal of whether the Commission’s actions were within its 
Constitutional powers. Because Commission’s powers are so broad and 
sweeping, Public Utility Company was required to clearly and convincingly 
demonstrate that Commission’s decisions were unlawful, unreasonable, or 
unsupported by substantial evidence, and the court determined that it had 
not. 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
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Murphy Oil Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins., No. 1:18-CV-1013, 2019 WL 
137626 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 1, 2019).  
 
The seller of an oil refinery (“Seller”) was sued by Buyer, who wished 
Seller to indemnify Buyer for damages sustained in connection with a fire 
after the sale of the refinery. Seller had contracted to indemnify Buyer for 
damages as a result of misrepresentation and environmental issues arising 
before the sale. Seller notified its Insurer and requested that it provide a 
defense under the terms of the insurance policy. Insurer declined, asserting 
it had no duty under the policy to defend against Buyer’s claims.  Seller 
filed suit to obtain a declaratory judgment concerning Insurer’s obligation 
to defend Seller against Buyer’s claims. The district court noted that there 
was conflicting state precedent, referencing precedent supporting an 
insurer’s obligation to defend claims arising from contractual liability when 
policy language allows, and also referencing precedent stating that a 
commercial general liability (“CGL”) policy never covers contractual 
liabilities, regardless of the policy’s exceptions. The court ultimately agreed 
with the precedent establishing that some contract claims might be covered 
by a CGL policy if the exclusion or exceptions in the contract allowed. 
Here, the court found that because Seller’s contract claim arose out of 
damages resulting from false representations and failures to deliver the 
property as bargained for, the claims were not covered by the language of 
the policy, which would cover damages arising out of “property damage”. 
Thus, the court concluded that Insurer did not owe Seller a duty to defend 
against Buyer’s claims, granting summary judgement for Insurer.  
 
This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher 
court as of publication. 
 
S.D. Texas 
Total E&P USA, Inc. v. Marubeni Oil & Gas USA, Inc., No. H-16-2671, 
2018 WL 6386263, (S.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2018). 
 
Corporation assigned its 25.834% interest in a pipeline to Oil Company. Oil 
Company filed Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and, with the approval of an ALJ, 
sold its interest in the pipeline to Purchaser, along with a divided overriding 
royalty interest in an oil and gas field going to Purchaser and the other half 
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going to a fund that would be used to offset Oil Company’s 
decommissioning obligations to the pipeline. Agency required Purchaser to 
decommission the pipeline, which it did, and Purchaser sought contribution 
for the costs of decommission from Corporation. Corporation filed suit 
against Purchaser, seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated 
to reimburse Purchaser for decommissioning costs. The trial court found 
that Corporation was liable for its share in decommissioning costs and that 
Oil Company’s bankruptcy fund did not fully satisfy Corporation’s 
obligations. Corporation filed a motion to determine which issues would be 
covered in the damages trial, claiming that expert testimony proposed 
would not be relevant to any issue at trial. Because the expert testimony 
proposed would go against the unambiguous language of the contract and 
would challenge Corporation’s liability, which the trial court already 





Lucky v. Carr (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/16/19); No. 52, 434-CA, 2019 WL 
210156. 
 
Purchaser sued Agent for breach of fiduciary duty after Agent bought land 
Purchaser was trying to buy and did not subsequently sell it to Purchaser, as 
per his oral instructions. Due to Purchaser’s reputation and wealth, he 
thought that if he directly bought the land, Seller would unfairly charge 
more for the land. As such, Agent was essentially tasked with acting as a 
shell purchaser. However, Purchaser and Agent never executed a written 
agreement regarding this instruction. Applicable state law required that 
agreements over the purchase or sale of immovable property must be 
reduced to writing to be enforceable. The lower court found that Agent did 
breach her fiduciary duties to Purchaser and awarded Purchaser substantial 
damages. Agent appealed, and the court held for Agent because Purchaser’s 
oral instructions to Agent were unenforceable, and Agent thus owed no 
fiduciary duties to Purchaser. 
 
Texas 
Apache Corp. v. Wagner, No. 02-18-00132-CV, No. 02-18-00135-CV, 
2019 WL 6215739 (Tex. App. Nov. 28, 2018).  
 
Purchaser acquired oil and gas assets from Seller pursuant to a purchase and 
sale agreement (“PSA”), which included an arbitration agreement. 
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Purchaser and Seller executed an assignment, conveyance, and bill of sale 
which incorporated the terms of the PSA. Purchaser then immediately 
executed an identical assignment of all property to a third company 
(“Assignee”), which incorporated the terms of the first assignment. Seller 
was subsequently sued and sought arbitration to cover the costs of the 
litigation from both Purchaser and Assignee. Purchaser and Assignee filed a 
declaratory judgment in state court, seeking a declaration that they were not 
liable and that the arbitration clause did not apply. Seller motioned to 
compel arbitration, which was denied and now appealed. This court 
reversed, holding that: (1) a valid arbitration agreement existed between 
Purchaser and Seller; (2) Assignee, a non-signatory to the original 
arbitration agreement was still bound to arbitrate, since the assignment 
incorporated the PSA’s terms and was effected on the same date; and (3) 
the terms of the arbitration agreement applied, and the carve-out exception 
in the agreement only applied to cross-claims within a third-party action, 
was were not applicable here. For these reasons, the appellate court 
reversed and remanded the case in order to compel arbitration.   
 
McDonald Oilfield Operations, LLC v. 3B Inspection, LLC, No. 01-18-
00118-CV, 2018 WL 6377432 (Tex. App. Dec. 6, 2018).  
 
Pipeline inspection company (“Company-1”) sued another pipeline 
inspection company (“Company-2”) for defamation and tortious 
interference with contract. Company-1 alleged that it had suffered damages 
after (1) Company-2 made comments to Company-1’s client, stating that 
Company-1 was “not a real company” and the owner “did not know what 
he was doing,” and (2) Company-2 revoked its sponsorship of Operator 
Qualifications for prior employees of Company-2 after those employees left 
Company-2 to work for Company-1. At the trial level, Company-2 moved 
to dismiss under the Texas Citizen Participation Act (“TCPA”), which 
allows for defendants to move to dismiss a meritless action where the 
defendant has properly exercised their right to free speech. The trial court 
denied the motion, and Company-2 appealed. Here, the appellate court 
reversed, stating that Company-2’s communications were within the scope 
of the TCPA because the communications in question either (1) concerned 
the qualifications of the employees of Company-1, which, as they were 
responsible for inspecting equipment which implicated public safety, was a 
matter of public concern; or (2) were related to “a good, product, or service 
in the marketplace.” Next, the court held that TCPA required that the claims 
be dismissed, since none of the claims, as alleged by Company-1, could 
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establish a prima facie case, and therefore, could not meet the minimum 
requirements to survive dismissal under the TCPA.  
 
Stephens v. Three Finger Black Shale P’ship, No. 11-16-00177-CV, 2018 
WL 6928989 (Tex. App. Dec. 31, 2018).  
 
Investors in a speculative project to buy and sell oil leases brought claims 
for breach of fiduciary duties, breach of contract, and fraud in a derivative 
suit against Company and Company’s Shareholders. Shareholders 
misrepresented the payment of their contracted investment amount through 
deceitful and creative accounting, resulting in Investors not receiving their 
fair amount of profits from the project. Shareholders, but not Investors, 
learned about a similar future venture while working on the project. 
Shareholders did not inform Investors of the venture opportunity, breaching 
their fiduciary duties to Investors. Shareholders then terminated the project 
with Investors and proceeded to fund the subsequent venture with profits 
from the completed project. Shareholders failed to pay Investors their share 
of the profits until after Shareholders funded the venture. The lower court 
ruled in favor of Investors. On appeal, Shareholders argued that Investors 
were not actually in a partnership with Company, so Shareholders did not 
owe Investors fiduciary duties. Shareholders pointed to the language of the 
participation agreement under which (1) Shareholders and Investors 
operated for the duration of the project, (2) Investors were only subject to 
losing their own investments rather than further loss splitting, and (3) 
Investors had no right or ability to engage with the management of the 
project. The court held for Shareholders and reversed the lower court’s 
judgments in favor of Investors’ non-existent partnership. However, the 
court reiterated that Investors still have individual claims against 
Shareholders and Company. 
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SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 
Federal 
 
4th Cir.  
Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n v. Forest Service, 911 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 
2018). 
 
Environmental Organizations (“Organizations”) appeal a decision of the 
United States Forrest Service (“Forest Service”) allowing Developer to 
place a pipeline through portions of National Forests and other protected 
areas. Organizations claimed that by allowing construction of the pipeline, 
the Forest Service violated the National Forest Management Act 
(“NFMA”), the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and the 
Mineral Leasing Act (“MLA”). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
determined that the Forest Service violated NFMA and NEPA, and “lacked 
statutory authority pursuant to the MLA to grant a pipeline right of way” 
across a protected area. First, the Forest Service violated the NFMA 
because it did not substantively analyze rules promulgated by the 
Department of Agriculture, which governs plans like those proposed by 
Developer. Further, the Forest Service failed to determine whether 
Developer’s “project could not be reasonably accommodated on non-
national forest land.” Second, the Forest Service violated NEPA for two 
reasons: (1) it failed to conduct a sufficiently independent review of 
FERC’s EIS on alternative locations to Developer’s plan when it adopted 
the EIS on the same day it was released, and (2) Forest Service 
inadequately analyzed landslide, erosion, and water quality risks. Third, 
Forest Service violated the MLA because even though the Forest Service is 
charged with managing “land underlying components” of the protected 
area, it is not given the responsibility of administering the protected area. 
Accordingly, Forest Service did not have proper authority to allow 
Developer’s project to go forward. 
 
Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 909 F.3d 635 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 
Environmental Group sought judicial review of Army Corps of Engineers 
(“Corps”) verifications of the construction of a pipeline under the Clean 
Water Act Nationwide Permit (“NWP”). The pipeline construction would 
result in the discharge of materials into federal waters, and the CWA 
requires Pipeline Company to obtain permits from Corps. Pipeline 
Company sought to utilize a general permit rather than a case-specific 
permit for its construction. State added additional approval requirements 
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under the NWP before Corps could grant the permit and conditionally 
issued certification as long as the conditions were met. Pipeline Company 
sought to utilize a dry cut construction method, and Corps requested State’s 
opinion on the matter. State approved the use of the dry cut method, 
however, Corps utilized 33 C.F.R. § 330.1(d)(1) to modify a “case specific 
activity’s authorization under NWP” and imposed several additional 
conditions in the reauthorization of the permit. Environmental Group 
challenged the verification and reinstatement of the permits by Corps, 
alleging Corps exceeded its authority in reinstatement to add additional 
special conditions instead of NWP requirement that state requirements 
become included into federal permits. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals held that the statute was not ambiguous, and Corps substituting 
its own conditions “in lieu of” the state requirements violated the CWA. 
The court then addressed whether Corps’ interpretation would be entitled to 
Skidmore deference, and held that Corps’ interpretation was not entitled to 
Skidmore deference. Thus, the Fourth Circuit underwent de novo review of 
Corps’ interpretation of its authority under the CWA to remove and insert 
an additional state requirement on a NWP and held that Corps had exceeded 
its statutory authority under the CWA, which requires that any state 
certification shall become a requisite for a federal permit.  
 
D. Nevada 
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 3:17-CV-
553-LRH-WGC, 2019 WL 236727 (D. Nev. Jan. 15, 2019).  
 
Environmental Advocate filed for summary judgment against BLM. BLM 
had leased almost 200,000 acres of land, including wetlands and other 
critical water features. Environmental Advocate argued that BLM did not 
analyze the impact of the sale on the critical wetlands, and its review was 
arbitrary and capricious. Environmental Advocate also argued that BLM’s 
actions violated NEPA. The court found that: (1) BLM need only take a 
“hard look” at environmental consequences of decision-making, and BLM 
had met this standard; (2) BLM appropriately analyzed the direct and 
indirect effects of fracking on the lands it leased; (3) BLM did not rely on 
outdated or inadequate data; and (4) BLM had analyzed “reasonably 
foreseeable” adverse effects on the wetlands, which is all that is required. 
Because BLM met all standards of review required before leasing the land, 
the Court granted BLM’s motion for summary judgment.  
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D. New Jersey 
PPP Indus., Inc. v. U.S., Civil Action No. 12-3526 (JMV) (MAH), 2018 
WL 6168623 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2018).   
 
Company sought to impose Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) liability on the United 
States Government for acting as an operator of the Company’s facility 
responsible for environmental damage resulting in their own environmental 
liability. The district court determined that in order to impose CERCLA 
liability based on “operator” status, the entity must exert something more 
than general control over the lower entity responsible for the environmental 
liability. Applying this standard to the United States’ government actions 
during WWI and WWII, the court found that the general influence the 
government exerted over the economy during wartime to fill national 
defense needs was insufficient to apply CERCLA liability for having an 
operator status. The government never seized the plant, never directly 
conducted the plant’s activities regarding pollution, and never installed 
employees in management positions.  As such, the government lacked 
operator status, and no CERCLA liability could be applied.   
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
W.D. Washington 
Lighthouse Res., Inc. v. Inslee, No. 3:18-cv-05005-RBJ, 2018 WL 6505372 
(W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2018).  
 
Export Company and Rail Carrier (collectively “Companies”) brought 
action against various Washington state officials (“State”) after being 
denied a water quality certificate under the CWA for Export Company’s 
proposed coal export terminal. State denied the application because (1) the 
environmental impact statement (“EIS”) identified “significant unavoidable 
adverse impacts,” including impacts on rails and vessels, which conflicted 
with state policies, and (2) there were not reasonable assurances that the 
terminal would meet water quality standards. Companies argued that State’s 
denial was preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
Termination Act (“ICCTA”) and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act 
(“PWSA”). State moved for summary judgment to dismiss these 
preemption claims. The court dismissed both of Companies’ preemption 
claims for the following reasons: (1) Companies did not have standing 
because, even assuming preemption, there were other grounds for denial 
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that would not be preempted, and the federal court would therefore be 
unable to vacate the denial; (2) there was no preemption under ICCTA, 
since denial of Export Company’s application, partially based on impacts to 
rail transportation,  could not be considered regulation under the scope of 
the ICCTA as Export Company was not itself a rail carrier and would not 
be performing rail transportation on behalf of Rail Carrier; (3) Rail Carrier 
could not claim preemption under ICCTA, even though ICCTA preempts 
state action that burdens rail transportation, because Rail Carrier’s loss of 
profits from a third party’s denied application was remote and incidental to 
the state action; and (4) Export Company could not show that the denial of 
the application based on impacts of vessel transportation conflicted with 
federal regulation under PWSA. Accordingly, the court granted summary 
judgement for State on these issues and dismissed Companies’ claims.  
 
D. Wyoming 
Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Jewell, No. 14-CV-97-ABJ, 2018 WL 
6419448 (D. Wyo. Dec. 6, 2018).  
 
Advocacy Organization petitioned for judicial review of a decision made by 
the U.S. Secretary of the Interior and other state agencies (“Agency”), 
arguing that: (1) Agency violated the APA when it did not solicit public 
comment before recommending and approving a mining plan modification, 
and (2) the plan failed to sufficiently ensure reclamation by establishing a 
bond release timetable. The court denied Advocacy Organization’s petition, 
finding that: (1) there were two separate, prior opportunities for public 
comment during the approval process, and the applicable federal 
regulations only require consideration of existing public comment during 
the approval phase in which Advocacy Organization wished to comment; 
(2) the failure to require a bond release program to gauge reclamation 
progress was not arbitrary and capricious since there were other ways to 
gauge the progress and compliance of contemporaneous reclamation needed 
in the modification plan which were considered; and (3) the issue of timely 
reclamation of federal land was to be considered and enforced on the state 
level of the approval process, and Agency only provides limited oversight 
over such matters. For these reasons, the court dismissed the petition for 
review and affirmed the approval of the modification plan. 
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